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Gisr.-Decedent transferred funds in her individual accounts with
four savings banks to four joint accounts in the names of the decedent
and the defendant payable to "either or the survivor of them," and
delivered the pass-books covering the joint accounts to the defendant.
Several months later decedent gave written notice to the banks, notifying each that the "privilege" previously given to the defendant to
withdraw any such moneys was thereby revoked. The funds in two
of the accounts were withdrawn by the decedent but later redeposited
in the joint accounts. Subsequent to the death of the decedent the
defendant withdrew the money on deposit at three of the banks. In
an action brought by the executors of decedent's estate to recover
these withdrawals from defendant, held, for the defendant. Under
Section 249, Subdivision 3 of the Banking Law 1 at the time of
deposit a rebuttable presumption arose that a true joint tenancy existed-that a gift of half of the funds deposited was intended, and,
at the time of the death of the depositor, a conclusive presumption
arose that the balance in the account was intended as a gift. Moskowitz
v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 167 N. E. 506 (1929).
Under the common law deposits made in a joint account would
have been insufficient to establish a gift of an interest in the funds
deposited, to take effect either presently or in the future.2 Section
144 of the Banking Law, enacted -in 1909,3 provided, in part, that a
deposit made by a person in the names of that person and another
and payable to either or the survivor, became the property of both
persons at the time of making the deposit, as a joint tenancy, payable
to either during their lives and to the survivor, and that a receipt
from the person to whom the deposit was paid was a valid release and
discharge to the bank, if the funds were paid out prior to receipt by
the bank of any notice in writing not to pay such deposit in accordance
with its terms. The purpose and effect of this enactment was to
change the common law rule and to make a deposit in the statutory
form presumptive evidence
of an intent to make a present gift of half
4
of the funds deposited.
"Laws of 1914, ch. 369.
- Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N. Y. 421, 22 N. E. 940, 6 L. R. A. 403, 15 Am.
St. Rep. 531 (1889); Matter of Bolin, 136 N. Y. 177, 32 N. E. 626 (1892);
Kelly y. Beers, 194 N. Y. 49, 86 N. E. 980, 128 Am. St. Rep. 543 (1909).
3
Laws of 1909, ch. 10.
'Clary v. Fitzgerald, 155 App. Div. 659, 140 N. Y. S. 536 (1913), aff'd
213 N. Y. 696, 107 N. E. 1075 (1915).
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When the present Banking Law was enacted in 1914,5 the provisions of Section 144 were carried over into Section 249, being restricted to savings banks deposits, however. An added sentence in
Section 249 provides: "The making of the deposits in such form
shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evidence in any action or proceeding to which either such savings bank
or the surviving depositor is a party of the intention of both depositors to vest title to such deposit and the additions thereto in such
survivor." The effect of the added provision is to establish a conclusive presumption after the death of the depositor of an intent to
make a gift of the funds remaining in the account to the survivor. 6
It does not affect the rebuttable presumption, which exists prior to
the death of the depositor, that a gift of half of the funds deposited
was intended.
The laws relating to tentative trusts 7 have no application in this
case. Here the depositor never declared herself to be a trustee. No
trust was ever created.8
The effect of the statute as presently construed with respect to
funds deposited by an individual in a joint account is: during the life
of the depositor (a) as between the parties a rebuttable presumption
exists that a gift of half of the funds was intended, (b) the bank is
not liable in paying the funds to either person named in the account,
in the absence of notice not to pay in accordance with the terms of
the deposit; after the death of the depositor (a) a conclusive presumption exists that a gift of the entire amount in the account at the time
of death was intended; (b) and the bank incurs no liability in paying
the funds to the survivor. It is important to note that the amount to
which the survivor is presumptively entitled, at the time of deposit,
may exceed the amount in the account at the time a gift is conclusively established.
J. F. K.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS-ExECUTIVE

BUDGET.-In accordance with Article IV-A of the New York Constitution, Section 2, the Governor submitted to the Legislature the
executive budget which contained provisions for lump sum appropriations to the various administrative departments of the State Government. The proposed budget bill contained a provision giving the
Governor exclusive power over the segregation within each department of the lump sums thus appropriated. The Legislature struck out
'Supra Note 1.
'Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380, 167 N. E. 506 (1929).
"Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (1904).
'Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422, 36 Arm. Rep. 634 (1880).

